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1 Introduction 
Foreign exchange (FX) interventions are increasingly prominent. Policy makers, 
especially those from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are much more open to applying 
FX interventions as a policy tool than before (IMF, 2012; Blanchard et al., 2015; Ghosh et al., 
2017), without glamorizing it (Obstfeld et al., 2019). In line with this new appreciation of 
interventions, it is documented that central banks all over the world see this instrument as an 
integral part of their toolkit and apply it accordingly (Neely, 2008; Mohanty and Berger, 2013; 
Frankel, 2016). The mainstream policy stance is complemented by a set of theoretical papers 
building on existing literature (such as Vitale, 2003). These show that FX interventions can 
have positive effects for the economies applying them (Gabaix and Maggiori, 2015; Hassan et 
al., 2016; Fanelli and Straub, 2017; Chang, 2018; Basu et al., 2019; Cavallino, 2019). 
In contrast to these rather homogeneous positions of policy makers and theorists, there is 
less progress on the empirical front. We take stock of this literature later on. In summary, the 
most convincing evidence about the effectiveness of FX interventions may be based on event 
studies. An attractive feature of this approach is the use of daily (e.g., Fatum and Hutchison, 
2003; Fratzscher et al., 2019) or intra-daily data (e.g., Dominguez, 2003), which reduces the 
risk of reverse causality and of confounding factors. However, event studies, by definition, 
provide evidence over shorter horizons, such as a few days. Moreover, they typically treat actual 
interventions as the true policy shocks, while it is likely that actual interventions measure such 
shocks with error, for example, because communication accompanies the actual intervention. 
Studies addressing the longer-term impact of interventions by using lower frequency data 
(e.g., Blanchard et al., 2015) need to rely on tenuous assumptions (e.g., on instruments) and 
imprecise proxies of true intervention data. Studies improving on the estimation method are 
limited to quite specific country cases (e.g., Kearns and Rigobon, 2005). Thus, missing is an 
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approach that at least partially overcomes the inherent trade-offs by deriving longer-term 
predictions of the intervention impact based on daily data and a powerful estimation method. 
Therefore, in this paper we use structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) for the daily 
frequency identified with an external instrument to study the dynamic effects of FX 
interventions on financial markets. This methodology, also called a Proxy-SVAR, is developed 
in Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013), and is new to the FX intervention 
literature. It preserves the attractive features of the event study design and of models for lower 
frequency data but addresses some of their key limitations. First, it views the actual 
interventions as a noisy measure of latent intervention shocks. By accounting for several forms 
of measurement error, it reduces the attenuation bias present in estimates from models treating 
the actual interventions as a one-to-one mapping to the intervention shocks. Second, it allows 
quantifying the persistence of the effects of FX interventions, which is of key importance for 
macroeconomists and policy makers. Third, by relying on higher frequency data, it reduces the 
risk of confounding factors, reverse causality, and mismeasurement of policy-induced changes 
in reserves plaguing identification strategies for lower frequency data. 
We study some of the most important currencies in the world economy, i.e. Japanese Yen, 
US-Dollar, Euro, and British Pound. We select these currencies because they represent flexible 
exchange rate regimes (Ilzetzki et al., 2019), their markets are liquid, and intervention data are 
publicly available (or can be inferred from press reports for the Euro). In particular, we focus 
on Japanese and US interventions between 1991 and 2017 because these countries were 
relatively frequent interveners, giving us a sufficient number of actual interventions to obtain 
reliable estimates. In order to examine the generalizability of results, we repeat the analysis for 
the Euro Area and the UK, while acknowledging that we have only a handful of interventions 
for these two cases in the sample. 
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Using daily data limits the set-up of the SVAR to financial variables, but from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint this is not problematic. Given the high number of time-series 
observations from the daily sampling frequency, we can include many lags of the endogenous 
variables and still estimate the autoregressive part of the model reliably without running into 
the curse of dimensionality. This allows us to say something about the intervention impact at 
macroeconomically relevant horizons of several months or even quarters. 
The crucial issue for the identification approach is the instrument. We propose using the 
intervention direction on the first day of an intervention sequence as a proxy for latent 
intervention shocks. The central assumption is that concurrent news about the economy do not 
affect the decision to start and the direction of a new sequence. This decision typically requires 
the coordination between the central bank and the treasury, the latter having the legal lead on 
intervention policy, and is determined based on developments occurring over days or even 
longer horizons. Moreover, in a regime of largely floating exchange rates, there is no clear and 
communicated policy on exchange rate stabilization. So, the exact intervention days are largely 
exogenous at the daily frequency. Of course, interventions may be more or less probable, as 
argued by Frankel (2017), but they are not anticipated with any certainty. As interventions often 
occur in sequences, this argument holds in particular for the first day, or the first intervention 
during a day, but less so for subsequent interventions. We provide detailed evidence on this 
argument in Section 2.2 and note that high-frequency studies reveal that most of an 
intervention’s impact comes from the first intervention (e.g. Fischer and Zurlinden, 1999; Payne 
and Vitale, 2003), indicating that these surprise the market but less so subsequent interventions. 
We have three main findings. First, a surprise purchase of foreign currency by Japanese 
or US authorities depreciates the domestic currency significantly. For Japan, a one standard 
deviation intervention shock, corresponding to purchases of 1.7 billion USD, leads to an 
immediate depreciation of about 0.2% relative to the US-Dollar, Pound and Euro. A comparison 
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with previous findings (e.g., Kearns and Rigobon, 2005; Chen et al., 2012), and considering the 
same sample (shorter than our full sample), shows that our estimate is at the upper end of the 
available evidence, consistent with the argument that accounting for measurement error reduces 
the attenuation bias and leads to more precise estimates of the efficacy of FX interventions. 
Furthermore, the estimates reveal that intervention shocks explain up to 12% of Yen 
fluctuations on average. They also contributed to prevent an appreciation of the Yen during 
certain episodes, in particular when interventions reached a hitherto unseen frequency and level 
in 2003/04 and following the massive Tohoku earthquake in 2011. In contrast, US intervention 
shocks play only a minor role for the evolution of the US-Dollar. At the same time, they are 
more effective. We attribute this greater efficacy of interventions to some extent to interest rates 
being less constrained by the zero lower bound in the US during the sample, and the 
corresponding better functioning of the signaling channel, than in Japan, where policy rates 
approached zero already in the early 2000s. 
Second, the effects of FX interventions are highly persistent. The shocks move exchange 
rates significantly for up to four quarters in the case of Japan and for about one quarter in the 
US. Third, we provide novel evidence on the dynamic impact of interventions on other asset 
prices. We find that interest rates tend to fall in both countries, whereas the surprise depreciation 
has significant and heterogeneous effects on stock prices of large vs. small firms. Stock prices 
of the former (rather, exporters) increase, while those of the latter (rather, domestically-oriented 
firms) decrease or remain unaffected. Finally, for the Euro Area and the UK, we show that the 
currency depreciates significantly and persistently following exogenous interventions, as well. 
Literature.  Our study contributes to the literature about the effectiveness of FX 
interventions. One of the main challenges in this literature is the clean identification of an 
intervention impact in a macro environment where many forces interact. This seems easiest 
with high frequency data, which is where we start the short overview. 
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High frequency studies (e.g. Dominguez, 2003; Pasquariello, 2007; Melvin et al., 2009) 
can largely rule out interference by influences other than interventions due to the extremely 
short time interval of observation. However, their disadvantage is exactly this short-term 
concept. Although studies, such as Payne and Vitale (2003), use the conceptual term of a 
“permanent” price impact of interventions, this permanence refers to high-frequency data. They 
cannot say anything about the impact over many days, weeks or longer. Still, these studies 
provide evidence of interventions’ effectiveness. 
By comparison, event studies operate at lower frequencies. They typically use daily data 
and analyze horizons of days or a few weeks at most (e.g., Fatum and Hutchison, 2003; 
Fratzscher et al., 2019). Alternative approaches at this frequency include Kearns and Rigobon 
(2005), who exploit a policy change in Japan (and similarly in Australia), which is a country-
specific event. Thus, this method cannot be generalized. Chen et al. (2012) use a Bayesian data 
interpolation method to infer intra-daily intervention patterns from observable daily data as a 
way to improve identification. All of these approaches find that interventions are highly 
effective (see also Dominguez et al., 2012, 2013). However, estimates may be more affected by 
confounding factors than in high-frequency studies employing intra-day data. 
Another alternative approach is comparison to (self-constructed) counterfactuals. A prime 
example is Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) who, using transactions by the Swiss central bank, 
find that only interventions impact exchange rates, whereas transactions as fiscal agent (which 
are transparently classified as such to the market) do not move the exchange rate. To generalize 
such an approach, counterfactuals can either be created by time-series forecasts (which are 
highly unreliable, Rossi, 2013) or by matching approaches (e.g., Fatum and Hutchison, 2003). 
In relation to these approaches that rely on higher frequency data, conventional macro 
approaches seem to produce less reliable results. Still, there is new and innovative literature in 
this direction. Blanchard et al. (2015) analyze a cross-country panel with quarterly data, 
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basically using as an instrument for FX interventions, the closeness of a country’s reserves to 
an optimal level of reserves. Daude et al. (2016) take a similar route with monthly data, and use 
as instrument the ratio of reserves to M2. Finally, Adler et al. (2015) combine a set of 
instruments that are similar to the mentioned ones. All studies find evidence for effective FX 
interventions and, due to the lower frequency data, its impact seems to persist for months or 
longer. The problem with these approaches is the weakness of their instruments that may be 
plausible to some extent but tend to violate the exclusion restriction and cannot fully preclude 
reverse causality. Earlier papers in this direction include Dominguez and Frankel (1993), who 
use oral interventions as instrument for actual interventions, which would be not convincing in 
today’s environment where communication is part of the policy concept. 
The remaining paper is organized in five more sections. Section 2 describes the specific 
VAR model we employ. Sections 3 and 4 contain core and extended results for Japan, 
respectively. Section 5 documents the impact of intervention policy for the US and contains a 
replication of the estimation procedures for the Euro Area and the UK. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 The Proxy-SVAR model 
In this section, we first discuss the specification of the reduced form model, before we 
outline how we construct an instrument for FX intervention shocks. Last, we show how we use 
the instrument to identify the structural model. 
 
2.1  Reduced form model 
The VAR model is 
𝑦௧ = 𝑐 + Π(𝐿)𝑦௧ିଵ + Γ𝑥௧ + 𝑢௧, (1) 
and refers to variables at a daily frequency. The 𝑘 × 1-vector c includes constant terms, the 𝑘 ×
𝑙 matrix Γ collects the contemporaneous impact of l exogenous variables contained in the vector 
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𝑥௧, the matrix Π(𝐿) in lag polynomials captures the autoregressive part of the model, and the 
vector 𝑢௧ contains k serially uncorrelated innovations, or reduced form shocks, with 𝑉(𝑢௧) = Σ 
and 𝑢௧ ∼ 𝑁(0, Σ). 
We employ different specifications for the endogenous variables in 𝑦௧. The baseline 
specification includes the two variables that are the focus of most of the previous literature: the 
size of the interventions and the nominal exchange rate. Specifically, we compute the 
cumulative daily interventions in million US-Dollars over the full sample. We use the level of 
this variable as our policy indicator to scale the size of the policy shock and to estimate its 
persistence. Moreover, we use the log of the bilateral nominal exchange rate of the intervening 
country to its reference currency. We define it as foreign currency to domestic currency, such 
that an increase in the exchange rate implies an appreciation of the domestic currency. In 
extended models, 𝑦௧ includes the two baseline variables as well as additional variables, such as 
further bilateral exchange rates or interest rates and equity prices that change across 
specifications. Finally, to control for potential institutional or seasonal patterns, all models 
contain day-of-the-week and monthly dummies in the vector of exogenous variables. 
The VAR innovations are assumed to be linearly driven by an intervention policy shock 
𝜀௧
௣ that we aim to identify, and other structural shocks 𝜀௧∗ that are of no interest for the purpose 
of this paper. The VAR innovations 𝑢௧ are related to the structural shocks as 
𝑢௧ = 𝑏௣𝜀௧
௣ + 𝐵∗𝜀௧∗ (2) 
The 𝑘 × 1-vector 𝑏௣ captures the impulse vector to an intervention shock of size 1 and is 
required to generate impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock. We use the 
identification approach with external instruments developed by Stock and Watson (2012) and 
Mertens and Ravn (2013). When a variable 𝑠௧ is available such that 
𝐸(𝑠௧𝜀௧
௣) ≠ 0   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸(𝑠௧𝜀௧∗) = 0, (3) 
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it can be used to consistently estimate the impulse vector 𝑏௣. We now discuss how we compute 
𝑠௧ in order to ensure that the conditions in (3) are satisfied and then outline how we use it to 
estimate 𝑏௣ and to identify 𝜀௧
௣. 
 
2.2  Data and instrument 
Data.  We use higher frequency data (i.e. daily), as is common in the event study literature 
on FX interventions. The country samples depend on the data availability of the variables in 𝑦௧ 
and the specific FX regimes of the country under consideration. In the following, we mainly 
refer to the case of Japan, which publishes its daily intervention data in million USD, deferring 
a discussion of the data and institutional settings for the other countries to Section 5. In the 
bivariate models for Japan, the sample starts on April 1, 1991, when official data on 
interventions become available, and ends on January 4, 2017, for a total of 6,723 observations.1 
In some of the extended specifications, the sample starts later, as data for one of the additional 
variables are not previously available. The shortest sample starts on January 2, 1995, and 
contains 5743 observations. Given the large number of observations, we include 50 lags of the 
endogenous variables, even though Akaike's information criterion indicates only between 6 and 
19 lags, depending on the specification. In this way, we carefully control for secular movements 
in exchange rates and reliably estimate the responses of the endogenous variables at long 
horizons, such as 100 trading days.  
For the period covered, there are 325 intervention days in Japan. They are shown over 
time in the upper panel of Figure 1 and summarized in Table 1. Most are purchases of US-
Dollars. They cluster in the 1990s, but there are also interventions in the 2000s and 2010s. The 
                                                     
1 We obtained data on actual interventions for the US and Japan from data repository of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, for the UK from the website of the treasury, and constructed the data on Euro intervention 
from Factiva news reports. Exchange rates are daily spot rates from Bloomberg (mnemonics BP0003M, 
EU0003M, TI0003M, and US0003M). 
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average amount per intervention day is 2.2 billion US-Dollars. The Bank of Japan typically 
intervenes in sequences of several days or even weeks, as the difference between the 
unconditional and conditional intervention probability shows. 
<Table 1> 
The procedure how decisions are made is, for example, illustrated in Ito and Yabu (2007). 
The central bank conducts the interventions but is not the responsible authority to make these 
decisions. That authority lies with the Ministry of Finance (MoF), as in other advanced 
economies. Receiving the permission for interventions is a costly process, which may be why 
they occur in sequences. Officials have to convince the top authorities, which is a discretionary 
process. Given this permission, follow-up interventions do not need individual consent. 
<Figure 1> 
Instrument.  At the center of our identification strategy, we rely on the described fact 
that the decision to start such a sequence is usually not based on new information on the specific 
intervention day, but is related to medium and longer-term trends, as well as to general financial 
market and economic conditions. Hence, the first day of an intervention sequence can be 
considered as exogenous to contemporaneous exchange rates or other asset prices. By contrast, 
the subsequent decision after the first day of a new sequence and how long the sequence will 
last is taken on a day-by-day basis in response to current market conditions and the success of 
the initial intervention. 
The largely exogenous character of the first intervention day is also apparent from 
intervention objectives of central banks. According to the survey of Mohanty and Berger (2013, 
Table 2), the objectives are to smooth the trend path, limit pressure on exchange rates, limit 
volatility, etc. All these are longer-term developments, so that the specific day of the 
intervention is not predetermined but is the discretionary decision of the responsible authority; 
hence the intervention is not transparent to markets, similar to the surprise component of a 
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monetary policy decision. This becomes also clear when the policy process toward intervention 
is described, as it is assumed that the first intervention day is accompanied by effort to come to 
an intervention decision (yes or no) while later intervention days are then mainly covered by 
the first decision to intervene (e.g., Ito and Yabu, 2007). The longer-term basis for the first 
intervention decision is also reflected in event studies, such as Fatum and Hutchison (2003), 
who use averages over several days before the intervention as the basis to measure success. 
Finally, the most consistent empirical finding about intervention characteristics is that they 
“lean against the wind,” i.e. interventions are based on assessing the “longer-term” development 
of exchange rates, clearly reaching beyond one or a few days (Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Kearns 
and Rigobon, 2005; Fratzscher et al., 2019). 
As the first day of an intervention sequence is exogenous and, in this respect, different 
from other intervention days, the impact of interventions should also differ along this margin. 
Indeed, it is known from high-frequency studies (intra-daily data) that the first intervention 
contains almost all of the information and consequently moves the exchange rate while later 
interventions have much less impact (Zurlinden and Fischer, 1999; Payne and Vitale, 2003). 
We hypothesize that this pattern also holds at a daily level. 
Sequences.  The number of such sequences in our sample depends on the criterion used 
to define the start of a new sequence. We use the number of days without intervention before 
an intervention day to define a new sequence. Using a shorter window implies a larger number 
of non-zero observations for the proxy, while at the same time risks including interventions that 
are the continuation of an earlier sequence and, thus, potentially not fully exogenous. Therefore, 
we use a 5 day window, i.e. one trading week, in the construction of our baseline proxy (as used 
in Fatum and Hutchison, 2003, or Fratzscher et al., 2019). 
This window yields 56 non-zero observations for the instrument. They are summarized 
in the right column of Table 1. The average intervention on the first day of a sequence is 4.8 
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billion US-Dollars, implying that the central bank typically intervenes more than twice as 
strongly on this day than on the following days of a sequence. This is in line with the idea that 
the decision to start a sequence is largely exogenous while the decision to intervene 
subsequently is more likely to depend on the success of the initial day. In the sensitivity 
analysis, we show that our results are robust to using shorter windows and thereby increasing 
the number of non-censored instrument observations. Furthermore, the instrument contains 
both purchases and sales of foreign currency. Finally, we convert them into a categorical 
variable, shown in the bottom part of Figure 1, containing values 1, 0, and -1 to further reduce 
endogeneity concerns. This transformation implies that only the decision to intervene on a 
particular day but not the implied volume, which could potentially depend on the success of the 
first transactions within that day, is considered to be exogenous. 
The proxy is not required to be a correct measure of intervention shocks because several 
forms of measurement error can be accounted for (see Mertens and Ravn, 2013). This is 
important in our case as actual interventions are often accompanied by oral intervention such 
as communication of officials from the central bank or the Ministry of Finance (Fratzscher, 
2008). The latter, however, are difficult – if not impossible – to perfectly measure as there are 
no official accounts of oral interventions. Moreover, central bankers discuss further features of 
actual interventions beyond incidence and volume, such as the instrument (spot or derivatives). 
Consequently, models that treat the actual interventions as the true measure of interventions are 
likely to underestimate the effects of interventions due to the attenuation bias resulting from 
measurement error. In contrast, using an instrumental variable approach requires only that 𝑠௧ 
correlates with 𝜀௧
௣ to estimate the overall effect of interventions. 
 
2.3  Identification of the structural VAR 
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We now discuss how we use 𝑠௧ for the identification of the structural VAR. The key step 
consists of estimating what we will refer to as the relative impulse vector. Call 𝑏௜
௣ the entry i of 
the k × 1 impulse vector b୮ from equation (2). We normalize the variance of the structural 
shocks to unity, so that 𝑏௜
௣ captures how variable i responds to a one standard deviation change 
in 𝜀௧
௣. The 𝑘 × 1 relative impulse vector is defined as 𝑏෨௣ = 𝑏௣/𝑏ଵ
௣ = ൫1, 𝑏ଶ
௣/𝑏ଵ
௣, … , , 𝑏௞
௣/𝑏ଵ
௣൯′ 
and captures the response of the last 𝑘 − 1  variables relative to the first variable, which in our 
ordering is the policy indicator. 𝑏෨௣ can be estimated as ൫1, 𝛽መଶ/𝛽መଵ, … , 𝛽መ௞/𝛽መଵ൯
ᇱ
, with 𝛽መ௜ the 
estimated coefficients in the regressions 
𝑢ො௜௧ = 𝛼௜+𝛽௜𝑠௧ + 𝜈௜௧,        𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘,    (4) 
with uො ୧୲ the estimated VAR residual corresponding to equation i of model (1).2 The consistency 
of the estimate for 𝑏෨௣ follows from the fact that 𝐸(𝑢௧𝑠௧) = 𝛾𝑏௣ with 𝛾 = E(s୲ε୲
୮), due to (2) 
and (3). As outlined in Mertens and Ravn (2013), once we have an estimate of 𝑏෨௣, we can 
combine it with the covariance restrictions Σ = 𝐵𝐵′ with 𝐵 = [𝑏௣, 𝐵∗] to estimate the impulse 
vector 𝑏௣. 
We use (4) to assess the relevance of our instrument. We compute the F-statistic for the 
null hypothesis 𝛽௜ = 0, focusing on the first two equations of the VAR, i.e., those featuring the 
policy indicator and the USD/JPY exchange rate as dependent variable. For the bivariate model, 
the F-statistics are 509.2 and 47.9. For the extended model including interest rates and stock 
prices, they are 540.5 and 75.8. These high F-statistics suggest that the instrument is strong. 
 
  
                                                     
2 An alternative approach consists of regressing uො ୧୲ for i =  2, . . . , k on uොଵ୲, instrumented with s୲ 
(Mertens and Ravn, 2013). The two procedures deliver the same estimate for b෨ ୮ already in a finite 
sample, as can be verified analytically. 
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3 Results 
In this section, we present results for Japan. First, we show estimates for a bivariate 
baseline model (3.1) and an extended model containing further exchange rates to assess the 
effect of interventions on the currency value (3.2). Then, we extend the model by considering 
interest rates and stock prices (3.3). Finally, we show variance decompositions (3.4). 
 
3.1  Baseline model 
Figure 2 reports the impulse responses of the cumulative interventions and the USD/JPY 
exchange rate from the baseline bivariate VAR to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation. The solid line refers to the point estimate and the shaded area to 90% confidence 
bands, which are based on bootstrap techniques.3 The top panel shows that a surprise 
intervention leads to an immediate and significant increase in the cumulated intervention series 
by USD 1.7 billion. The effect is highly significant and persistent. Cumulative purchases of 
foreign currency peak at roughly USD 2.5 billion after about 50 trading days, before slowly 
returning to trend. 
<Figure 2> 
The intervention is associated with a large and highly significant devaluation of the 
domestic currency. The USD/JPY exchange rate depreciates upon impact by 0.2%. The impact 
is highly persistent as well. The exchange rate remains below the level where it would have 
been without the intervention shock over the full impulse horizon. Moreover, the impact is 
statistically significant for 250 trading days. The strong and long-lasting effects are consistent 
                                                     
3 We apply a fixed-design wild bootstrap, as in Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Gertler and Karadi 
(2015). For each bootstrap we recursively generate pseudo data after randomly selecting a subset of 
days and then changing sign of the estimated vectors of VAR innovations on those days. For 
identification within each bootstrap, in correspondence to the same day, we change the sign of 𝑠௧. 
Within each bootstrap we then apply the procedure discussed in Section 2. Confidence bands are 
constructed on 200 bootstrap replications. 
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with the high persistence of the intervention. These results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
in line with existing evidence on the effect of FX intervention in the USD/JPY market, as we 
show in detail in Section 4.1. There we also highlight that our immediate impact is slightly 
larger than the one documented in two previous studies, which is consistent with the argument 
that the Proxy-SVAR approach removes a potential attenuation bias present in models treating 
the actual intervention volume as the true policy shock. 
Looking also at other currency markets, the result on USD/JPY is qualitatively confirmed 
by evidence on the DEM/USD market, where Dominguez (2003) estimates the maximum 
impact of a one billion US-Dollar intervention to be 0.29%. In smaller (emerging) markets, 
however, the FX intervention impact is much larger, such as 1.8% on 100 million US-Dollar 
for the Australian Dollar (Kearns and Rigobon, 2005) or 0.8% on 60 million US-Dollar for the 
Colombian Peso (Kuersteiner et al., 2018). 
At the same time, our results reveal novel insights into the persistence of the effects. In 
high-frequency studies, the “permanent” effect lasts for hours (e.g., Payne and Vitale, 2003). 
The horizon of event studies is a little longer, although this depends on the exact success 
criterion chosen. If we refer, for example, to Fatum and Hutchison (2003), their direction 
criterion measures the impact during a post-intervention period of 2 to 15 days. In robustness 
exercises, they extend this period up to 30 days and find that the intervention effect becomes 
insignificant. There are only a few macro-oriented studies, including Blanchard et al. (2015), 
Adler et al. (2015), and Daude et al. (2016), considering effects over several months. However, 
their approach differs from ours in three respects: first, they mainly cover emerging markets 
and, thus, predominantly not floating exchange rates; second, their measure of FX intervention 
is necessarily quite imprecise as they cannot rely on true intervention data but proxies derived 
from changes in official reserves; and, third, while their IV-estimation is innovative in the field, 
the specific assumptions are at the same time debatable. Overall, according to our knowledge, 
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the implementation of a well identified structural VAR is new to the literature on FX 
intervention. Thus, our empirical result of a “persistent” effect (lasting several months and up 
to quarters) has a previously unmet level of credibility. 
 
3.2  Effects on further exchange rates 
While focusing on the direct impact of a Japanese intervention on the USD/JPY exchange 
rate, we extend this bivariate model also to two other important exchange rates relative to the 
Yen, i.e. the Euro (EUR/JPY) and the British Pound (GBP/JPY). It is expected that the 
intervention in the USD-JPY market, intended to weaken the Yen, will impact the two other 
exchange rates into the same direction due to the interrelations on foreign exchange markets. 
Results are shown in Figure 3. 
<Figure 3> 
The graphs on cumulated interventions and their impact on the USD/JPY remain largely 
the same, although the impact on the exchange rates is slightly weaker. The impacts on 
EUR/JPY and GBP/JPY mirror qualitatively those of the targeted US-Dollar. The initial effects 
are similar for all three currencies. The most relevant difference compared to the bivariate 
model is that the impact on the EUR/JPY turns insignificant after about 30 to 40 trading days; 
this may be partially caused by the fact that the USD/EUR rate is the most important exchange 
rate and dominates any impacts from the Yen and respective interventions. Overall, these results 
support the impression of a significant impact of FX intervention on exchange rates. 
 
3.3  Effects on interest rates and stock prices 
The two models presented so far provide a first impression of interventions on exchange 
rates. We next extend the bivariate model, presented in Section 3.1, by also considering four 
interest rates and two stock market indices, i.e. large and small firms listed on the Tokyo Stock 
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Exchange.4 Specifically, to capture the differential stances of monetary policy, we consider the 
short-term (three months) interest rate differential between Japan and the US. In addition, we 
consider the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year risk-free interest rates in Japan. 
The additional variables serve two purposes. First, we are interested in the asset market 
effects of FX intervention shocks per se, as these have received only scant attention in the 
literature. Movements in interest rates in response to the intervention shocks can give 
indications about changing expectations about inflation or future monetary policy of market 
participations and stock prices may approximate risk appetite and future real growth of the 
domestic economy.  
Second, a large model addresses potential concerns about omitted variables in the smaller 
models. To see whether the augmented structural VAR model is invertible, we follow Stock 
and Watson (2018) and test the null hypothesis that lags of the instrument are jointly equal to 
zero in each of the VAR equations. We consider up to six lags. Table 2 indicates that there is 
no statistically significant evidence against the hypothesis of invertibility. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that exchange rates, interest rates, and equity prices summarize a 
potentially large set of information such that there are no omitted factors. 
<Table 2> 
Figure 4 shows that the impact of FX intervention shocks on the USD/JPY in the larger 
model is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the effects in the smaller models. Moreover, 
it reveals that the responses of interest rates tend to be first negative, but that they are often only 
marginally statistically significant. For the short-term interest rate differential, it is comforting 
that there is no instantaneous impact; this confirms that we indeed observe a FX intervention 
                                                     
4 We use the MSCI Japan Large (Small) Cap Index, which contains 139 (979) constituents and covers 
approximately 70% (14%) and of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in Japan. We obtained 
both series from Bloomberg (mnemonics MXjplc index and MXjpsc index, respectively). The 
mnemonics for yield data from Bloomberg are GJGB3M Index, GJGB1 Index, GJGB2 Index, GJGB5 
Index, and GJGB10 Index. 
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shock and not contemporaneous monetary policy effects. To reduce the risk of confounding 
monetary policy shocks further, we check for all 56 days with non-censored proxy observation 
whether there was a concurrent monetary policy event. We find only two such overlaps (March 
8, 2000 and August 4, 2011) and excluding them leaves the results virtually unchanged. 
<Figure 4> 
Turning to the longer-term interest rates, their reaction follows a similar pattern, being 
mostly insignificant except for a significant decrease of the two-year rate (by 0.1 basis points) 
for the first 10 to 20 days. Otherwise, interest rates tend to fall by about 0.1 to 0.2 basis points 
during the first 20 days and from thereon they tend to rise for another 20 days, overshoot the 
starting level by about 0.1 to 0.2 basis points and then move toward the level before the shock. 
An explanation might be that monetary policy tends to slightly support the intervention-
intended weakening of the Yen by rather loosening than tightening. While this may shortly 
spillover to the longer-term rates, potential effects of a Yen depreciation on inflation and growth 
would induce higher interest rates before the overall limited effects level off. 
The situation is different for stock prices. A depreciation of the Yen improves the 
competitiveness of exports and may allow firms to increase associated profits. FX intervention 
can however affect firms differently, depending on how export-oriented and competitive they 
are (for a model, see Verhoogen 2008). Empirically, we find that large firms’ stock prices are 
immediately positively impacted by the intervention shock. They rise significantly by about 
0.1% for 10 days and keep their level thereafter. The depreciation increases the competitiveness 
of exports, which are more important for larger and more internationally oriented firms and, 
thus, supports their business. By contrast, the impact of the shock on the stock prices of small 
firms is negative by about 0.1% for 10 days, before stock prices return to the pre-shock level. 
The negative effect seems reasonable, as this more domestically-oriented segment of the 
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economy profits less from the depreciation boosting exports, while at the same time incurring 
higher import costs. 
 
3.4  Variance and historical decomposition 
To quantify the average economic importance of FX interventions for exchange rate and 
other asset price fluctuations, Table 3 documents the contribution of the estimated intervention 
shocks to the forecast error variance of the respective time-series at various horizons. 
Turning to cumulated interventions, the high explained variance is a rather mechanical 
effect as intervention shocks are the main driving force. Turning to asset prices, the largest 
effect is observed on the USD/JPY exchange rate. Here the explained variance starts at a 
remarkable 11.5% and decreases to 5.2% for longer horizons. This indicates that intervention 
shocks are relevant for understanding the USD/JPY exchange rate (although its influence on 
the exchange rate is not dominating). By contrast all 20 effects on interest rates – regarding the 
four measures and five horizons – remain below 0.4% are thus rather negligible. Finally, the 
explained variance of stock prices is larger than that of interest rates but still small. The share 
of explained variance is larger for large firms than for small firms, and is between 0.5% and 
0.7% over the horizons covered. 
<Table 3> 
To assess the economic importance of intervention shocks during certain times in our 
sample, we compute a historical decomposition of the exchange rate. The top panel of Figure 5 
shows that the contribution of intervention shocks to the bilateral USD/JPY exchange rate is 
limited throughout most of the sample. There are, however, two noteworthy episodes where 
interventions curbed the appreciation of the Yen: in 2003/04 when purchases of USD reached 
hitherto unseen frequency and levels under the newly appointed Director General of the MoF’s 
International Bureau Hiroshi Watanabe, and in 2011 following the massive Tohoku earthquake 
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and the ensuing Tsunami hitting Japan’s coast. This is reflected in the estimated intervention 
shocks in the bottom panel, which suggest that Japanese authorities massively purchased 
foreign currency during these episodes to stem the appreciation of the domestic currency, 
consistent with the implicit aim of smoothing the exchange rate. 
<Figure 5> 
 
4 Results in perspective 
In this section, we put our main results in perspective. First, we compare them with those 
of earlier papers by adjusting the sample period (4.1). Second, we compare our identification 
strategy to an alternative identification scheme (4.2); third, we use modified versions of the 
instrument addressing concerns that it is predictable (4.3); and, fourth, we assess the robustness 
of the results to various model specification issues (4.4). 
 
4.1  Comparison with the literature 
In order to more exactly compare the intervention impact with those measured in other 
studies about USD/JPY interventions, we use the model from Section 3.1, adjusting the 
observed sample period to align more closely to those of Kearns and Rigobon (2005) and Chen 
et al. (2012). In particular, we let the sample end in 2010, which removes the few huge 
interventions from 2011. In this way, we also assess the suitability of the assumption that the 
start of an intervention sequence is exogenous to the current economic environment. This 
condition is more likely to hold when the central bank is in the market frequently (as in the 
earlier part of the sample) than when it is intervening rarely, in which case FX policy is more 
likely prompted by something concurrent. Moreover, we adjust the shock size to one trillion 
Yen as in the mentioned papers. 
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Figure 6 contains the results. Relative to the full period 1991-2017 (thick solid line with 
confidence bands), the intervention impact nearly doubles. It increases from about 1.2% to 
nearly 2% (dotted line). This impact is larger than the comparable impacts estimated by Kearns 
and Rigobon (1.49%) and Chen et al. (1.8%). As, for example, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) 
emphasize the policy change in June 1995, we also test whether a start of the analysis after this 
point in time has a major influence on our results. This is not the case, as can be seen from the 
dashed lines, and the immediate impact is the same as for our longer sample. Next, we combine 
both modifications of the sample and test whether a later start (in 1995) and an earlier end (in 
2010) jointly affects the estimates. The dash-dotted line shows that the results are similar to 
those if we exclude only the later part of the sample. Finally, we shorten the sample further to 
investigate whether the policy change in 2004 toward fewer but larger interventions affects our 
results by ending the sample in 2004. Again, the impact in the shorter sample is larger than for 
the full sample (see thin solid line). 
<Figure 6> 
 
4.2  Comparison to identification via timing restriction 
So far, the literature based on daily data usually relates some measure of the exchange 
rate to intervention volume. Often, there is the additional assumption that the latter is 
exogenous. In a dynamic setting, this amounts to a Cholesky decomposition of the reduced form 
covariance matrix of a model with the cumulated intervention sequence ordered first. Such a 
model means that FX interventions are assumed to contemporaneously impact the exchange 
rate and the other asset prices in the model, but not the other way round, and that the actual 
intervention volume correctly measures the intervention shock. 
Instead, if our argument holds that only the first day of an intervention sequence can be 
considered as exogenous and that intervention often contains elements of communication as 
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well, we would expect that the Proxy-SVAR produces larger and more precise estimates of the 
efficacy of interventions. First, it does not consider subsequent interventions within a sequence 
as exogenous, which might introduce a bias toward zero in the estimates if the central bank 
leans against the wind on a day-by-day basis. Second, it accounts for measurement error and 
does not treat the actual interventions as a one-to-one mapping to the structural shocks, thereby 
reducing a potential attenuation bias. 
Figure 7 presents the estimates from a Cholesky ordering of the variables, and our 
modeling approach (from Section 3.3). It shows that the Proxy-SVAR leads to larger impacts 
of FX intervention shocks. Regarding the exchange rate, the effect is twice as large and lasts 
for 100 days, whereas for the recursive model it is indistinguishable from zero after only 10 
days. Interest rates show the same pattern as before, but effects are even smaller and consistently 
insignificant under the timing restriction. Regarding stock prices, there is no longer an effect 
on large firms and only a short-lived effect (5 days) on small firms’ stock prices. Thus, it may 
be reassuring that a different method leads to the same qualitative findings but if one is 
convinced by the superiority of the Proxy-SVAR, this method is crucial to obtain relatively 
large and persistent effects on exchange rates and stock prices. 
<Figure 7> 
 
4.3  Reaction function, longer interventions, and coordinated interventions 
In this subsection, we perform three analyses to see how the results are affect by our 
definition of the instrument. First, we use a policy reaction function approach to clean the 
instrument. Second, we redefine intervention sequences using a stricter criterion. Third, we 
exclude coordinated interventions. In all three cases, we scale the policy shock to one standard 
deviation of the baseline model for comparability and focus on the bivariate model for brevity. 
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Policy reaction function.  We argue that the first day of any intervention sequence is 
largely exogenous. This implies that - although market participants form expectations about 
future interventions - it is difficult to forecast these days. In order to capture this reasoning, we 
use the reaction function for Japanese FX interventions proposed by Ito and Yabu (2007). 
Assuming that interventions being explained by this approach can be expected, we take the 
(unexplained) residual as instrument in our Proxy-SVAR. These values deviate at most +/- 7% 
from the values of the categorical variable (1, 0, -1) used in the baseline specification. Thus, it 
is not a surprise that the estimated intervention impact, shown by the solid line in Figure 8, is 
graphically difficult to distinguish from the impact relying on our baseline instrument. We 
conclude that the exact intervention day is actually hard to anticipate. 
<Figure 8> 
Longer intervention sequences.  Next, we evaluate whether our argumentation for 
instrument exogeneity based on the institutional design for intervention policy relates to the 
length of an intervention sequence. Ex ante, it is conceivable that our assumption is better suited 
for longer sequences with larger volumes than for shorter and smaller sequences, as the former 
might require more preparatory work and coordination between the Bank of Japan and the 
Ministry of Finance. To test this hypothesis, we re-define intervention sequences as consisting 
of at least two intervention days within five trading days. We leave the definition of the start of 
a sequence unchanged such that there are no interventions in the preceding five trading days. 
The dotted line in Figure 8 shows that the estimated effect of intervention shocks based on the 
modified instrument is qualitatively the same as for the baseline definition of the instrument or 
the cleaned instrument. It remains statistically significant. However, the effect decreases 
substantially, both upon impact and thereafter. Ex post, we interpret the smaller estimate as 
reflecting selection bias in the redefinition of the instrument. Using only longer spells seems to 
imply focusing on sequences that are less successful initially and, therefore, are continued 
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longer, such that the estimated impact based on this subset of non-censored instrument 
observations declines. 
Internationally coordinated interventions.  Finally, we assess how the baseline results 
change when excluding coordinated interventions. It is a stylized fact that these interventions 
have larger effects. For data availability reasons, we exclude days from the sample when US 
monetary authorities also intervened. There are seven such days in the sample. Indeed, the 
dashed line shows that the estimated impact on the exchange rate decreases, but the depreciation 
remains statistically significant for 45 days. 
 
4.4  Robustness 
In this section, we summarize the results from an extensive sensitivity analysis. The 
Appendix contains the corresponding figures. They demonstrate that our main results are robust 
and tend to provide a conservative, that is, lower bound estimate of the effect of FX 
interventions. In detail, we exclude either the weekday or month dummies from the set of 
exogenous variables, or include either a linear trend or year dummies. The differences are so 
small that they are invisible graphically, so we do not report them in a separate figure in the 
Appendix. Furthermore, we use the following different numbers of lags of the endogenous 
variables: 10, 20, 30, 40, 60, and 70. Outcomes presented in Figure A1 show that there are no 
major qualitative modifications to the benchmark results. 
Next, we consider alternative definitions of our instrument. On the one hand, we change 
the definition of an intervention sequence by shortening the time-window before the start of a 
new sequence without interventions from 5 days in the baseline specification to 4, 3, 2, 1, and 
0 days, respectively. This increases the number of non-zero observation of the proxy up to 325 
actual intervention days. But the corresponding Figure A2 shows that the impact decreases in 
the size of the disconnection window since the risk of defining continuation days of an earlier 
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sequence as a new sequence increases. On the other hand, we use the actual intervention size, 
instead of a categorical variable indicating the direction of the intervention, which we winsorize 
at the 10% level to remove outliers. The estimated impact decreases slightly in absolute size 
but remains significant for about 100 trading days (see Figure A3). 
Then, we consider further modifications of the sample. We cut 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years of 
observations both at the beginning and at the end of the sample, and estimate the model on all 
25 different subsamples. The results shown in Figure A4 indicate that the estimated impact is 
larger when excluding more recent years, but that the effect is of similar order of magnitudes 
across subsamples. 
Finally, regarding statistical inference, we use an alternative bootstrap methodology, i.e. 
the residual-based moving block bootstrap proposed by Jentsch and Lunsford (2019) for Proxy-
SVARs as an alternative to the wild bootstrap. Following the suggestion of the authors, we set 
the block length to 45, given our sample size, perform 1,000 replications, and focus on 68% 
confidence bands as this bootstrap is known to produce much wider confidence bands. 
Additionally, we report 90% error bands. Figure A5 shows that our main results are robust. 
There is a depreciation of the currency that is statistically significant for more than two quarters 
according to the 68% confidence bands and for about one quarter when looking at the 90% 
intervals. The impact on interest rates is largely insignificant, but stock prices respond 
significantly based on the 68% level for a few days following the shock. 
 
5 Evidence for the US, Euro Area, and UK 
After showing that the identification and estimation methodology works well and 
produces reasonable estimates for Japan, we turn to an analysis of the US, Euro Area, and the 
UK, both for their own sake and as tests of the external validity to alleviate concerns that the 
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above results may be driven by unknown specifics of the Japanese case. All three countries 
have had floating exchange rates throughout the sample period. 
 
5.1 Evidence for the US 
We focus on the US first. Here, the Treasury has the legal responsibility for FX 
interventions, as in Japan. It closely cooperates with the Federal Reserve. On behalf of both, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducts the market operations, which it sterilizes. 
Interventions were relatively frequent until the early 1990s. Subsequently, they are less 
frequent, while after 1995 there are only a few, albeit important, cases. For comparability, we 
use the same sample, extended model specification, and lag length as for Japan. For the period 
before the introduction of the Euro, we use the Deutsche Mark/USD exchange rate as reference 
cross-rate and the German short-term rate to compute the interest rate differential.5 
Table 4 contains summary statistics for US interventions. There are 38 actual 
interventions in the sample – most are sales of the foreign currency, typically Deutsche Mark/ 
Euro or Yen – such that the unconditional intervention probability on a given day is below 1%. 
As for Japan, the conditional probability is substantially larger, implying that in the US there is 
also a tendency to intervene in sequences, although they are on average shorter. The average 
daily volume as well as the maximum daily purchase and sale are smaller as well – at USD 
0.38, 1.31 and 1.60 billion, respectively. 
<Table 4> 
The right column in Table 4 shows that we have 25 non-censored observations for the 
instrument, including both purchases and sales of foreign currency and the maxima of each. We 
                                                     
5 To measure stock prices of large (small) companies we use the Dow Jones Industrial Average 30 
Index and the Russel 2000 Index, respectively. We obtain all financial data for the US model, 
including interest rates, from Bloomberg. The mnemonics are: DJITR Index, RU20INTR Index, 
USGG3M Index, USGG2YR Index, USGG5YR Index, and USGG10YR Index. 
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construct it analogously to the case of Japan, that is, we use only starts of sequences, which are 
defined as having at least five preceding days without intervention. The instrument is strong. 
The F-statistic is 3842.3 and 16.7, when testing its relevance for instrumenting the residuals of 
the cumulated intervention equation and the exchange rate equation, respectively, in the 
extended eight-variable model. To ensure that it is uncorrelated with US monetary policy 
shocks, we compare all 25 days with the dates of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
meetings. There is no overlap. 
Figure 9 contains the dynamic effects of an intervention shock of one standard deviation. 
This corresponds to an initial purchase of foreign currency of about USD 50 million and, on 
average, a few additional purchases over subsequent days. The US-Dollar depreciates 
immediately by roughly 5 basis points. The effect is statistically significant at the 90% level. 
The currency remains significantly below trend for about 40 trading days. Then, it gradually 
returns to the level where it would have been without the surprise intervention and from which 
it cannot be distinguished statistically two months after the shock. 
<Figure 9> 
The interest rate differential does not respond upon impact. This indicates that there is no 
confounding US monetary policy shock, which is consistent with our earlier assertion that none 
of the 25 non-censored instrument observations coincides with a FOMC meeting. From the 
second day after the exogenous intervention onwards, however, the interest differential declines 
significantly and persistently, potentially reflecting a more accommodative stance of the 
Federal Reserve. In line with the drop in the short-term rate, longer-term interest rates drop 
significantly as well; by roughly half of a basis point after 5 days. The impact dies out after 
about 10 days. The value of firms increase, but only the impact effect for large companies is 
statistically significant. 
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Qualitatively, the estimates for the US are similar to those for Japan. Our results indicate, 
for a purchase of foreign currency, a significant depreciation of the domestic currency, a 
tendency for interest rates to fall, and a tendency for stock prices to increase – in particular 
those of larger companies. This is reassuring as it suggests that our earlier estimates reveal a 
more general pattern of the asset market effects of surprise FX interventions, which can be an 
effective tool for stabilizing the exchange rate. 
However, there are also some interesting differences between the countries. Consistent 
with the raw data, which show that the US typically intervenes with smaller volumes (see Table 
4), a one standard deviation shock in the US is substantially smaller in terms of US-Dollars than 
in Japan. Moreover, while there is a tendency in both countries to intervene in sequences, the 
intervention response in the US is less hump-shaped, peaking earlier. In line with the lower 
volume of cumulative sales of USD for a given initial intervention, the depreciation is more 
short-lived and less statistically significant than in Japan. Table 5 shows that interventions also 
play a smaller role for fluctuations of the exchange rate in the US. They explain an average of 
between 1% and 2% of the forecast error variance, depending on the horizon. They have 
essentially no explanatory power for longer-term interest rates and stock prices, but contribute 
up to 5% to the variability of the interest rate differential. 
<Table 5> 
At the same time, interventions are more effective in the US. An unexpected initial 
purchase of foreign currency worth USD 1 billion has an impact effect of 0.85% on the 
exchange rate. In Japan, a shock of the same size implies an impact effect of 0.13%. One 
potential explanation for this difference is that the signaling channel, whereby interventions 
signal the future stance of policy, is more powerful during the sample period in the US. In 
particular, there is only one non-censored proxy observation (March 18, 2011) for the US during 
the period when the federal funds rate was at the zero lower bound. In sharp contrast, about half 
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(27) of the non-censored proxy-observations for Japan coincide with periods when the short-
term rate was below 0.5%. As Japanese policy rates already fell to zero in the early 2000s and 
attempts to pursue unconventional monetary policies faltered, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy – and thus part of the signaling channel – was essentially clogged during a large part of 
the sample. In contrast, this seems to have been less of a constraint on the effectiveness of FX 
interventions in the US. 
This interpretation aligns with the significant and persistent drop of the short-term interest 
rate differential in the US, which falls by about 30 basis points two months after an intervention 
shock of USD 1 billion. For a same-sized shock, the differential barely moves in Japan, falling 
by less than half of a basis point, and the response is essentially indistinguishable from zero. It 
is also in line with the larger explanatory power of intervention shocks for US short-term 
interest rate differentials, where they explain up to 5%. In Japan, they contribute less than half 
of a percent to the variance of that variable. 
 
5.2 Evidence for the Euro Area and UK 
Finally, we present some tentative evidence for the Euro Area and the UK. Starting with 
the Euro Area, the European Central Bank (ECB) intervened only during two episodes. The 
first episode comprises four intervention days in fall of 2000, shortly after its inception, when 
the Euro depreciated continuously against the USD amid uncertainty about the monetary policy 
of the newly created central bank and strong US growth. The second episode corresponds to a 
single event on March 18, 2011. Several major central banks sold JPY to weaken the currency, 
which appreciated sharply due to a repatriation of funds of Japanese insurance companies and 
the closing of carry trades funded in JPY following the Tohoku earthquake. 
The ECB does not officially publish the intervention days or volumes. However, there 
seem to have been only a few specific intervention days that can be dated relatively precisely 
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based on financial press involving unofficial ECB statements and trading rumors. We identify 
these dates using Factiva news search. We use the same search to obtain approximations of the 
implied volumes, which were estimated by market participants and partly communicated 
unofficially by ECB members in media articles. For the intervention on September 22, 2000, 
we assume USD sales worth 2.5 billion based on Roussel et al. (2000).6 For November 3 and 
6, 2000, we assume USD sales totaling 1.2 billion, drawing on Tannenbaum (2000). We found 
no information about the intervention volume on November 9, 2000, so we simply set it to the 
same size as the previous two intervention days, that is, sales of USD 0.6 billion. Finally, for 
March 18, 2011, we assume sales of JPY worth USD 0.3 billion based on Suoninen (2011). 
As before, we use an indicator for the first day of a sequence as instrument based on the 
five-day criterion, implying that we have three non-censored observations for the proxy. Given 
this limited number, we set the lag length to 25 and focus on the bivariate model containing the 
cumulated intervention series and the exchange rate. Moreover, we start the analysis with the 
inception of the Euro on January 1, 1999. 
The left column of Figure 10 shows the responses of the intervention level and the 
nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the USD to an intervention shock of one standard deviation. 
As there is some persistence in the intervention data due to the sequence in November 2000, 
the cumulated interventions peak after about one trading week and then revert slowly to trend. 
The Euro depreciates significantly upon impact, weakening by roughly 5 basis points. 
Thereafter, it remains below trend for 5 trading weeks. For the first three weeks the depreciation 
is statistically significant. 
<Figure 10> 
                                                     
6 The exact references are as follows: Roussel, Edward, Sonja Dieckhoefer, Tom Kohn, Hellmuth Tromm and 
Vincent del Giudice. 2000. G-7 Nations Intervene for First Time to Boost Euro (Update 7), Bloomberg News 
(BN), Sep. 09, 2000;  Suoninen, Sakari. 2011. ECB Forex Reserves Rise After Yen Intervention – Reuters News. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon, Mar. 29, 2011;  Tannenbaum, Mark. 2000. Euro Falls as Appeal of U.S. Economy 
Outweighs ECB Purchases. Bloomberg News (BN), Nov. 6, 2000. 
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Next, we turn to the UK. The Bank of England publishes intervention dates and volumes. 
We limit the analysis to the period 1994 onwards to exclude the extraordinary FX market 
conditions and interventions related to the speculative attacks against the British Pound in the 
early 1990s. This data limitation implies that we now have only two actual interventions in the 
sample. Therefore, we keep the reduced lag length and the bivariate model as used for the Euro-
case. Moreover, we analyze the EUR/GBP exchange rate because the interventions occurred in 
this particular market. The right column of Figure 10 shows that the intervention shock 
corresponds to a purchase of Euros worth USD 2 million. The unexpected intervention leads to 
an immediate weakening of the Pound, which drops by roughly 2 basis points. The currency 
remains significantly below trend for about two weeks, and thereafter returns to the level where 
it would have been without the shock. 
In summary, we find that the cases of Euro Area and UK interventions in the FX market 
tend to support the experience of Japan and the US, despite serious data limitations. While the 
pattern of observations is qualitatively similar across countries, the intervention impact appears 
stronger for the US, Euro Area, and UK than for Japan. 
 
6 Conclusions 
FX intervention is, in many respects, a macro issue. Despite being a common method in 
other areas of macroeconomic research, such as examining the impact of monetary policy, the 
literature on FX interventions hesitates to apply VAR-approaches. The empirical problem is the 
partial endogeneity of FX interventions and the difficulty of measuring them precisely, as they 
are multi-dimensional policy actions. So, how can we properly identify FX interventions and 
still obtain results that fit into macro-oriented research? 
While some macro-oriented papers make major assumptions for identification, we remain 
closer to the convention of working with higher frequency data and apply an approach that is 
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new to the field of FX intervention: the external instrument VAR that combines a regular VAR 
with an event study identification strategy. The identifying assumption is based on the fact that 
FX interventions typically occur in sequences. Each first FX intervention then differs from 
subsequent ones because the first intervention is typically not driven by events on the specific 
day but by exchange rate developments over a longer period; in particular, in floating exchange 
rate regimes. This assumption is well documented in the intervention objectives of central banks 
and reflected in the empirical literature. 
With this identification strategy, we set up the Proxy-SVAR, which has three appealing 
consequences: first, this method provides a more precise estimate of the impact of intervention 
shocks than conventional SVARs or other time-series techniques that do not account for 
measurement error; second, by way of the SVAR we can better assess the persistence of the 
effects than in event studies; and, third, by extending the SVAR to further asset prices beyond 
exchange rates we obtain a fuller picture of its broader impact. 
We apply this approach focusing on Japanese and US data because both countries have a 
flexible exchange rate, are relevant markets, and there are many publicly known FX 
interventions. Our main findings are threefold: (i) interventions have a sizable impact on the 
exchange rate. For Japan, a 1.7 billion US-Dollar intervention has a contemporaneous impact 
on the USD/JPY of 0.2%. This shock is of similar size but somewhat higher than many previous 
estimates, fitting the expectation that the method we employ reduces the attenuation bias. For 
the US, the impact of intervention shocks is larger. (ii) The impact on the exchange rate remains 
significant for several months. (iii) Interest tend to fall in response to the intervention shock, 
whereas stock prices of larger firms rise. Robustness checks show that these main findings hold 
in various settings and extensions. Moreover, applying the approach to a small set of Euro Area 
and UK FX interventions confirms their effectiveness for exchange rate stabilization. 
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Figure 1: Interventions and instrument 
The figure shows the actual FX interventions by of the Bank of Japan. The top panel contains all 325 
interventions in the sample. The bottom panel shows the 56 starts of an intervention sequence as 
categorical variable, which we use as an instrumental for the identification of latent intervention shocks. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for Japan 
 All interventions 1st day of sequence 
Number of interventions   
Number of interventions 325 56 
Purchases of foreign currency 319 53 
Sales of foreign currency 6 3 
Unconditional probability 0.05 0.01 
Conditional on previous intervention 0.65 0 
   
In billion USD   
Average intervention 2.16 4.79 
Average purchase 2.30 5.16 
Average sale -5.29 -1.80 
Median intervention 0.80 1.21 
Maximum purchase 103.53 103.53 
Maximum sale -20.32 -2.21 
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Figure 2: The dynamic effects of FX intervention shocks in Japan 
The figure shows the response of cumulated interventions (in billion USD) and the USD/JPY exchange 
rate (in %) to an intervention shock of one standard deviation over a horizon of 250 trading days, along 
with 90% confidence bands from 200 bootstrap replications based on a SVAR(50) identified with an 
external instrument. 
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Figure 3: Effects of FX intervention shocks in Japan on other currencies 
The figure shows the responses of cumulated interventions and nominal exchange rates of the Japanese 
Yen to a one standard deviation intervention shock over a horizon of 100 trading days, along with their 
90% confidence bands from 200 bootstrap replications, based on a SVAR(50) identified with an external 
instrument. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Test for invertibility of SVAR identified with external instrument 
The table shows p-values for a robust F-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients on 1 to 
1-6 lags of the instrument are jointly equal to zero in each of the VAR equations of the extended model. 
 Equation 
Lags Interv-
ention 
USD/ 
JPY 
Int. rate 
diff. 
Two-
year rate 
Five-
year rate 
Ten-
year rate 
Large 
caps 
Small 
caps 
1 0.91 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.66 0.38 0.37 0.68 
2 0.36 0.32 0.59 0.63 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.20 
3 0.32 0.39 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.26 
4 0.47 0.46 0.30 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.20 
5 0.59 0.61 0.40 0.23 0.08 0.07 0.21 0.30 
6 0.71 0.70 0.51 0.32 0.11 0.08 0.30 0.41 
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Figure 4: Responses of interest rates and stock prices to JPY-intervention shock 
The figure shows the responses of different asset prices to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 100 trading days, along with their 90% confidence bands from 200 bootstrap 
replications based on a SVAR(50) identified with an external instrument. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Forecast error variance decomposition. 
Horizon Inter-
vention 
USD/ 
JPY 
Int. rate 
diff. 
Two-
year rate 
Five-
year rate 
Ten-year 
rate 
Large 
caps 
Small 
caps 
1 94.9 11.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.8 
5 92.2 10.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.7 
10 89.9 9.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.5 
50 82.2 6.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 
100 78.3 5.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 
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Figure 5: Historical decomposition of USD/JPY exchange rate and estimated 
intervention shocks 
The upper panel shows the historical decomposition of the observed USD/JPY nominal exchange rate 
(solid line) and the exchange rate without the contribution of the intervention shocks (dashed line). The 
lower panel contains the estimated structural intervention shocks (thin line) and their cumulated version 
(thick line). 
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Figure 6: Subsample estimates 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an intervention shock of USD 9.35 
billion, or JPY 1 trillion, over a horizon of 250 trading days based on a SVAR(50) identified with 
external instrument estimated over the full sample (solid line), along with 90% confidence bands, and 
the point estimates for different subsamples. 
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Figure 7: Comparison of Proxy-SVAR and recursive identification 
The figure shows the responses of different asset prices to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 100 trading days based on a SVAR(50) identified with an external instrument 
(solid line) and based on a SVAR(50) identified recursively with the cumulated interventions ordered 
first (dashed line), along with their 90% confidence bands. 
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Figure 8: Impulse responses for modified instruments 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation in the baseline model for 50 trading days based on a SVAR(50) identified with modified 
external instruments, along with 90% confidence bands using 200 bootstrap replications. The solid line 
refers to an instrument cleaned through a policy function approach, the dotted line to longer intervention 
sequences including at least one additional intervention in the five days following the initial intervention, 
and the dashed line to an instrument that excludes coordinated interventions. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the US 
 All interventions Instrument (start of sequence) 
Number of interventions   
Number of interventions 38 25 
Purchases of foreign currency 7 6 
Sales of foreign currency 31 19 
Unconditional probability 0.006 0.004 
Conditional on previous intervention 0.105 0 
   
In billion USD   
Average intervention -0.38 -0.33 
Average purchase 0.36 0.41 
Average sale -0.55 -0.57 
Median intervention -0.25 -0.20 
Maximum purchase 1.31 1.31 
Maximum sale 1.60 1.60 
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Figure 9: The dynamic effects of FX intervention shocks in the US 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 50 trading days based on a SVAR(50) identified with an external instrument, 
along with 90% confidence bands using 200 bootstrap replications. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Forecast error variance decomposition for the US. 
Horizon Inter-
vention 
USD/ 
EUR 
Int. rate 
diff. 
Two-
year rate 
Five-
year rate 
Ten-year 
rate 
Large 
caps 
Small 
caps 
1 99.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5 99.2 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
10 98.5 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 
50 90.6 1.1 2.9 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 
100 83.3 1.5 5.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.4 
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Figure 10: The effects of FX intervention in the Euro Area and UK 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 25 trading days based on a bivariate SVAR(25) identified with an external 
instrument, along with 90% confidence bands using 200 bootstrap replications, for the Euro Area (left 
column, solid lines) and for the UK (right column, dashed lines). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure A1: Robustness to using alternative lag length 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 100 trading days based on a SVAR(p), for p=10,20,30,40,60,70 identified 
with an external instrument, along with 90% confidence bands using 200 bootstrap replications for the 
baseline specification with p=50. 
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Figure A2: Robustness to alternative definition of intervention sequence 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 100 trading days based on a SVAR(50) identified with an external instrument 
using a 1, 2, 3, and 4 day disconnect between actual interventions to define a new intervention sequence, 
along with 90% confidence bands using 200 bootstrap replications for the baseline specification using 
a 5-day disconnect. 
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Figure A3: Robustness to using intervention volume as instrument 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 100 trading days from an SVAR(50) identified with an external instrument, 
which is based on the 10%-Winsorized intervention volume on the first day of an intervention sequence, 
along with 90% confidence bands using 200 bootstrap replications. 
 
 
 
  
Intervention
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
1
2
3
USD/JPY
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
50 
 
Figure A4: Robustness in subsamples 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an FX intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 100 trading days from an Proxy-SVAR(50) in 25 subsampled constructed 
by cutting 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years at the start or the end of the sample, along with 90% confidence bands 
of the baseline specification using the full sample and 200 bootstrap replications. 
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Figure A5: Robustness to an alternative bootstrap procedure 
The figure shows the responses of the endogenous variables to an FX intervention shock of one standard 
deviation over a horizon of 100 trading days from an Proxy-SVAR(50), along with 90% (dark grey) and 
68% (light grey) confidence bands based on a residual-based moving block bootstrap using 1,000 
replications. 
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